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Abstract In a recent paper, Pettigrew (Philos Stud, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11098-019-01377-y) argues that the pragmatic and epistemic arguments for
Bayesian updating are based on an unwarranted assumption, which he calls deter-
ministic updating, and which says that your updating plan should be deterministic.
In that paper, Pettigrew did not consider whether the symmetry arguments due to
Hughes and van Fraassen make the same assumption (Hughes and van Fraassen in:
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.
pp. 851–869, 1984; van Fraassen in: Rescher N (ed) Scientific inquiry in philo-
sophical perspective. University Press of America, Lanham, pp. 183–223, 1987). In
this note, I show that they do.
Keywords Bayesianism  Bayesian updating  Conditionalization  Probabilism 
Bayesian epistemology  Credences  Symmetry
According to Bayesians, when I learn a proposition to which I assign a positive
credence, I should plan to update my credences so that my new unconditional
credence in a proposition is my old conditional credence in that proposition
conditional on the proposition I learned. In other words, if P is my credence function
before I learn E, and PH is the credence function I plan to adopt in response to
learning E, and PðEÞ[ 0, then it ought to be the case that, for all X in F ,
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PHðXÞ ¼ PEðXÞ :¼ PðXjEÞ :¼
PðXEÞ
PðEÞ :
There are many arguments for this Bayesian norm of updating. Some pay attention
to the pragmatic costs of updating any other way (Brown 1976; Lewis 1999); others
pay attention to the epistemic costs, which are spelled out in terms of the inaccuracy
of the credences that result from the updating plans (Oddie 1997; Greaves and
Wallace 2006; Briggs and Pettigrew 2018); some show that updating as the
Bayesian requires, and only updating that way, preserves as much as possible about
the prior credences while still respecting the new evidence (Diaconis and Zabell
1982; Dietrich et al. 2016). And then there are the symmetry arguments that are our
focus here (Hughes and van Fraassen 1984; van Fraassen 1987; Grove and Halpern
1998).
In a recent paper, I argued that the pragmatic and epistemic arguments for
Bayesian updating are based on an unwarranted assumption, which I called
deterministic updating, and which says that your updating plan should be
deterministic (Pettigrew 2019). An updating plan specifies how you’ll update in
response to a specific piece of evidence. Such a plan is deterministic if there’s a
single credence function that it says you’ll adopt in response to that evidence, rather
than a range of different credence functions that you might adopt in response. That
is, if E is a proposition you might learn, deterministic updating says that your plan
for responding to receiving E as evidence should take the form:
If I learn E, I’ll adopt PH.
It should not take the form:
If I learn E, I’ll adopt PH or I’ll adopt Py or ... or I’ll adopt P.
In that paper, I did not consider whether the symmetry arguments due to Hughes and
van Fraassen make the same assumption. In this note, I show that they do.
1 The symmetry argument for conditionalization
Let’s start by laying out the symmetry argument. Suppose W is a set of possible
worlds, and F is an algebra over W. Then an updating plan on M ¼ ðW;FÞ is a
function UM that takes a credence function P defined on F and a proposition E in F
and returns the set of credence functions that the updating plan endorses as
responses to learning E for those with credence function P. A family of updating
plans contains an updating plan for each M ¼ ðW;FÞ. Then we impose four
conditions on a family of updating plans U.
Coherence An updating plan should take a probabilistic credence function and a
proposition and return a set of probabilistic credence functions.
More precisely: If P is a probabilistic credence function, and PH is in UMðP;EÞ,
then PH is a probabilistic credence function.
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Deterministic Updating An updating plan should endorse only one credence
function as a correct response to learning a piece of evidence to which the prior
assigned positive credence.
More precisely: If PðEÞ[ 0, then jUMðP;EÞj ¼ 1.
Certainty Any credence function that an updating plan endorses as a response to
learning E should be certain of E.
More precisely: If PH is in UMðP;EÞ, then PHðEÞ ¼ 1.
Symmetry The way that an updating plan would have you update should not be
sensitive to the way the possibilities are represented.
More precisely: Let M ¼ ðW;FÞ and M0 ¼ ðW0;F0Þ. Suppose f : W ! W0 is a
surjective function. That is, for each w0 in W0, there is w in W such that f ðwÞ ¼ w0.
And suppose for each X in F0, f1ðXÞ ¼ fw 2 W j f ðwÞ 2 Xg is in F . Then the
worlds in W0 are coarse-grained versions of the worlds in W, and the propositions in
F0 are coarse-grained versions of those in F . Now, given a credence function P on
F , let f(P) be the credence function over F0 such that f ðPÞðXÞ ¼ Pðf1ðXÞÞ. Then
the set of credence functions that UM
0
endorses as responses to learning E0 for
someone with prior f(P) is the image under f of the set of credence functions that
UM endorses as responses to learning f1ðE0Þ for someone with prior P. That is,
UM
0ðf ðPÞ;E0Þ ¼ f ðPHÞ jPH 2 UMðP; f1ðE0ÞÞ
 
¼ f ðUMðP; f 1ðE0ÞÞÞ:
Now, van Fraassen proves that these four conditions together entail the Bayesian
rule of updating:
Conditionalization An updating plan should exhort you to update by condition-
alizing on any piece of evidence to which your prior assigns positive credence.
More precisely: If PðEÞ[ 0, then UMðP;EÞ should contain only one credence
function, namely, PEðÞ :¼ PðjEÞ.
That is:
Theorem 1 (Hughes and van Fraassen) Deterministic updating ? Coherence ?
Certainty ? Symmetry ) Conditionalization.
2 The role of Deterministic Updating
The problem with van Fraassen’s argument is that, while Coherence and Certainty
are uncontroversial, and Symmetry is very plausible, there is no good reason to
assume Deterministic Updating. After all, there’s nothing irrational about making
non-deterministic plans in general. On Friday, I might plan as follows: If it rains on
Saturday, I’ll do the laundry or I’ll darn my socks. This plan is non-deterministic;
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but it seems quite reasonable. And the same goes for non-deterministic updating
plans.
However, the symmetry argument cannot go through without assuming
Deterministic Updating. To see this, consider the following updating rule, which
I’ll call V. To define it, we must first introduce some notation. Suppose
M ¼ ðW;FÞ. If w is in W, then define the following credence function vw on F :
vwðXÞ :¼
1 if X is true at w
0 if X is false at w

vw is sometimes called the omniscient credence function at W or the valuation
function of W.
Then, if P is a credence function on F and E is in F , let:
VMðP;EÞ ¼ fvw jw 2 W &E is true at wg
That is, VM takes P and E and returns the set of valuation functions of those worlds
in W at which E is true.
Theorem 2 V satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry, but not Deterministic
Updating or Conditionalization.
Proof in Appendix. So V satisfies Coherence, Certainty, and Symmetry, but, it is
not the Bayesian updating rule. And this is possible because it does not satisfy
Deterministic Updating. The apparent upshot is that we must assume Deterministic
Updating if we are to use van Fraassen’s symmetry considerations to establish
Conditionalization. But, as I pointed out in my previous paper, there does not seem
to be any principled reason to require it.
3 Other conditions on updating rules
But perhaps this is a little quick. After all, we have no reason to think that
Coherence, Certainty, and Symmetry exhaust the conditions we should impose on
updating rules. Van Fraassen lists only those because, together with Deterministic
Updating, they are sufficient to pin down Conditionalization—he has no need to
look for any further conditions. But if we drop Deterministic Updating and find that
Conditionalization doesn’t follow, then perhaps we can nonetheless add further
well-motivated conditions to make up for the shortfall.
So, is there some further condition that V fails to satisfy? Yes, there are some.
But we can easily find closely related updating plans that do satisfy these further
conditions, as well as Coherence, Certainty, and Symmetry, but which do not satisfy
Deterministic Updating or Conditionalization. We’ll describe these below. After
we’ve done this, we’ll look at a further condition that, along with the others, entails
Deterministic Updating and Conditionalization. But we’ll note that it might well be
too strong. Its intuitive force can be captured by a weaker principle that our
amended versions of V satisfy.
Here’s the first of our further conditions:
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Stationarity Updating on E should have no effect if you are already certain of E.
More precisely: If PðEÞ ¼ 1, then UMðP;EÞ ¼ fPg.
V does not satisfy Stationarity. But we can alter it so that it does. Let W be the
following family of updating plans:
WMðP;EÞ ¼
fvw jw 2 W & E is true at wg if PðEÞ\1
fPg if PðEÞ ¼ 1

Then W satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry ? Stationarity.
Next, here are two further conditions:
Evidential Regularity If you assign positive credence to a possibility before
updating, and the evidence you learn doesn’t rule out that possibility, then the
updating rule should demand that you assign positive credence to that possibility
after learning.
More precisely: If PðwÞ[ 0, and E is true at w, and PH is in UMðP;EÞ, then
PHðwÞ[ 0.
Responsiveness It should at least be possible for your prior to make a difference
to your posterior.
More precisely: There are P1;P2 such that P1ðEÞ;P2ðEÞ[ 0, and
UðP1;EÞ 6¼ UðP2;EÞ.
W does not satisfy Evidential Regularity or Responsiveness. But we can alter it
so that it does. Given 0 k 1, let Xk be the following family of updating plans:
XMk ðP;EÞ ¼
fkPE þ ð1  kÞvw jw 2 W & E is true at wg if 0\PðEÞ\1
fPg if PðEÞ ¼ 1

If 0\k\1, then Xk satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry ? Stationarity ?
Evidential Regularity ? Responsiveness.
To state the next property, we need a measure of distance between credence
functions defined on the same algebra F . There are many we could use, but for our
purposes it will suffice to use the most natural, which sums up the differences





Continuity Small changes in the prior credence in E should not give rise to large
changes in the set of credence functions that the updating rule endorses upon
learning E.
More precisely: For all e[ 0, there is d[ 0, such that, if DðP1;P2Þ\d, then, for all
PH2 in UðP2;EÞ, there is PH1 in UðP1;EÞ such that DðPH1 ;PH2 Þ\e.
Xk does not satisfy Continuity. After all, if we aren’t fully certain of E, then the
updating rule endorses the k-mixture of PE with every vw; but once we become
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certain of E, it endorses only P ¼ PE. Again, we can alter it so that it does satisfy
Continuity.
YMðP;EÞ ¼ fPðEÞPE þ ð1  PðEÞÞvw jw 2 W & E is true at wg
Then:
Theorem 3 Y satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry ? Stationarity ?
Evidential Regularity ? Responsiveness ? Continuity, but not Deterministic
Updating or Conditionalization.
Proof in Appendix.
Next, we come to a condition that, together with Stationarity, entails Determin-
istic Updating.
Strong order invariance Updating first on E and then on EF should always
result in the same posteriors as updating first on F and then on EF.
More precisely: If PðEFÞ[ 0, then for all Py in UMðP;EÞ and PH in UMðP;FÞ,
UMðPH;EFÞ ¼ UMðPy;EFÞ
Theorem 4 Strong Order Invariance ? Stationarity ? Certainty ) Deterministic
Updating
Proof in Appendix. How should we respond to this? We might simply accept Strong
Order Invariance and use it, Stationarity, and Certainty in place of Deterministic
Updating to plug the hole in van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for Conditional-
ization. But another possibility is that we find Strong Order Invariance too strong.
We might find that it is too much to ask that whichever choice you make after
learning E will then lead to the same options after you then learn EF as if you first
learn F, make any choice in response to that, and then learn EF. Instead, we might
think:
Weak Order Invariance Updating first on E and then on EF should sometimes
result in the same posteriors as updating first on F and then on EF.
More precisely: If PðEFÞ[ 0, then there are Py in UMðP;EÞ and Pyy in
UMðPy;EFÞ as well as PH in UMðP;FÞ and PHH in UMðPH;EFÞ such that
Pyy ¼ PHH.
Now, note that Y satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry ? Stationarity ?
Evidential Regularity ? Responsiveness ? Continuity ? Weak Order Invariance.
So those conditions do not entail Deterministic Updating or Conditionalization.
There are no doubt further conditions on updating rules we might consider that
would plug the gap left in the symmetry argument for Conditionalization when we
reject Deterministic Updating, but I will not consider them. I will leave our
investigation here, noting that, relative to the conditions we’ve considered, the
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Appendix: Proofs of results
Theorem 2 V satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry, but not Deterministic
Updating.
Proof It is easy to see that V satisfies Coherence and Certainty, since each vw is a
probabilistic credence function, and since each vw is certain of E for each w at which
E is true. To see that V satisfies Symmetry, the crucial fact is this: for each w in W,
f ðvwÞ ¼ vf ðwÞ. Proof of this little fact: for any X in F0,
f ðvwÞðXÞ ¼ 1 , vwðf1ðXÞÞ ¼ 1 , w 2 f1ðXÞ , f ðwÞ 2 X , vf ðwÞðXÞ ¼ 1.
Back to the main proof. First, take a credence function in VM
0ðf ðPÞ;E0Þ: that is, vw0
for some w0 in E0. Then if f ðwÞ ¼ w0, then w is in f1ðE0Þ and so vw is in
VMðP; f1ðE0ÞÞÞ. Now f ðvwÞ ¼ vf ðwÞ ¼ vw0 , so vw0 is in f ðVMðP; f1ðE0ÞÞÞ. Next,
take a credence function in f ðVMðP; f1ðE0ÞÞÞ. That is, f ðvwÞ for some w in f1ðE0Þ.
But f ðvwÞ ¼ vf ðwÞ, which is in VM
0ðf ðPÞ;E0Þ, since f(w) is in E0. This completes the
proof. h
Theorem 3 Y satisfies Coherence ? Certainty ? Symmetry ? Stationarity ?
Evidential Regularity ? Responsiveness ? Continuity, but not Deterministic
Updating or Conditionalization.
Proof Y satisfies Coherence because PE and vw are both probabilistic credence
functions, and thus any mixture of them is as well. Y satisfies Certainty because PE
is certain of E and so is vw, whenever E is true at w, and so any mixture of them is
certain of E. The proof that Y satisfies Symmetry proceeds similarly to the proof
that V does. We simply add the fact that f ðPEÞ ¼ f ðPÞf ðEÞ. Y satisfies Stationarity
because, if PðEÞ ¼ 1, then PðEÞPE þ ð1  PðEÞÞvw ¼ PE ¼ P, for all w. Y satisfies
Evidential Regularity, because if PðwÞ[ 0 and E is true at w, then PðEÞPEðwÞ[ 0
and so PðEÞPEðwÞ þ ð1  PðEÞÞvw0 ðwÞ[ 0. Y satisfies Responsiveness, because
P1ðEÞP1ðjEÞ þ ð1  P1ðEÞÞvwðÞ 6¼ P2ðEÞP2ðjEÞ þ ð1  P2ðEÞÞvwðÞ for
many priors P1;P2. Y satisfies Continuity, because if e[ 0, we let d ¼ e2jF j. Then, if
DðP1;P2Þ\d, then jð1  P1ðEÞÞ  ð1  P2ðEÞÞj ¼ jP1ðEÞ  P2ðEÞj\ e2jF j and
jP1ðXEÞ  P2ðXEÞj\ e2jF j. So




j½ðP1ðEÞP1ðXjEÞ þ ð1  P1ðEÞÞvwðXÞÞ


















Theorem 4 Strong Order Invariance ? Stationarity ? Certainty ) Deterministic
Updating.
Proof Suppose U satisfies Strong Order Invariance and Stationarity. Suppose E is
in F and > is the top element of F , so that > is true at all worlds; and suppose P is
defined on F . We’re going to consider what happens when you update first on E,
then on E> (which is, of course, E), and what happens when you update first on >
and then on E>. Take Py from UMðP;EÞ. By Certainty, PyðEÞ ¼ 1. Then, by
Stationarity, UMðPy;E>Þ ¼ fPyg. Also by Stationarity, UMðP;>Þ ¼ fPg, since
Pð>Þ ¼ 1. So, by Strong Order Invariance
UMðP;EÞ ¼ UMðP;E>Þ ¼ UMðPy;E>Þ ¼ fPyg
as required. h
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